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Abstract 
The paper considers mechanisms for organizing free trade in the electricity market, which are based on submitting bids of 
energy consumers and producers to the market operator. The research focuses on the models of market operation as a 
double sided auction where participants have different rights (price takers and active competitors). The authors discuss and 
compare possible strategies of generator behavior that lead to different equilibrium situations and correspond to Cournot 
model and the models of supply function equilibrium, and a perfectly competitive equilibrium. The mechanisms are tested 
on the basis of the Siberian electric power system, Russia. 
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1. Introduction 
Successful operation of electric power industry implies coordinated action of generation companies which 
aim to optimize system operation both technically and economically. In 2011 the second stage of the reform of 
electric power industry came to an end, and as a result we switched to a fully liberalized market based on 
absolutely different conditions. Now instead of vertically integrated natural monopoly the electric power 
industry represents four independent stages: electricity production, transport, distribution and supply. 
Moreover, competition is introduced to all levels, but transport. It is assumed that market competition affects 
the prices, and that their level should both sufficiently satisfy consumers and effectively develop the industry. 
Therefore, we need models suitable to analyze specific features of the market architecture and rules of 
organizing the interaction among market participants. What we mean is the mathematical models, which 
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describe the actions of generation companies, on the one hand, and the actions of consumers, on the other hand, 
under the conditions of a liberalized market. 
Each of the models presented below implements its own market architecture. The difference will depend on 
what factors the suppliers will be guided by when submitting the bids (their supply functions) to the market: by 
the market price, demand elasticity, supplies by competitors, actions of competitors, if the amount of supplies 
changes, etc. This mechanism will be considered efficient if electricity suppliers act in an optimal  way from 
the viewpoint of the chosen criteria and the strategies chosen by economic agents are stable.  
In scientific literature one of the most widespread approaches to the analysis and forecasting of electricity 
market conditions is the use of microeconomic models of Cournot type, SFE-Supply Function Equilibrium (or 
rather its linear variant). All these approaches take into account the capacity constraints. 
The Cournot model is one of the most widely used to analyze the functioning of imperfectly competitive 
markets. It is not difficult to add capacity constraints to Cournot model and adapt it to the spot electricity 
market [1]. At the closed auction the producers compete against each other in their bids – supply functions, 
including the step ones. Equilibrium without rationing has stability conditions, under which the volumes of 
production correspond to Cournot local equilibrium. 
Models of supply function equilibrium represent a comparatively new invention in economic science. The 
authors of [2] were first to introduce them, and the authors of [3] considered them with respect to electricity 
markets (taking into account capacity constraints). Some scientific papers [4, 5] developed a linear variant of 
supply function equilibrium and its application to the analysis of the market in Great Britain and Wales. 
In Russian studies the modeling of domestic wholesale electricity market on the basis of the approach with 
linear supply functions was considered in [6, 7]. 
Interaction in the electricity market can be described by a conjectured supply function model. In this 
approach each agent models their own strategy on the basis of the assumption about the actions of their 
competitors. It is important that the information is not perfect, which makes the model more real. The theory 
started to rapidly develop in the mid-1990s [8, 9, 10]. In [11] the approach is considered in terms of the 
network constraints for the electric power industry. One of the special cases of the expected supply function 
model is the Cournot competition, which can be applied if demand is inelastic (which is characteristic of the 
spot electricity market). 
A number of studies are devoted to the search for equilibrium among producers in the spot market in terms 
of transmission constraints  in the case of nodal price formation, i.e. price is determined at each node as  a dual 
variable with respect to the balance constraint for the corresponding node [12, 13, 14].  
Some papers focus on the search for stable equilibrium in the models by the method of adaptive dynamics. 
In the studies [15, 16] the authors proved that in many cases there is no convergence to equilibrium in the 
equilibrium functions under constant marginal costs and peak demand. The problem arises when the constraint 
on the output of generation companies becomes active. In this case the strategies can be reduced to the 
strategies corresponding to the models of Walras, Cournot, or have no convergence (get cycled). 
The goal of modeling is not only to find equilibrium but also to assess the actions of competing companies. 
The authors of [17], for example, indicate the possibility of considerable manipulation in the short term and 
estimate the actions of oligopolists in the medium term when the strategies of interaction are formed on the 
basis of orientation to the market power of individual companies. 
In Russian literature there are only few scientific papers on the specific features of functioning of modern 
electricity markets. The author of [18] distinguishes several possible ways of organizing electricity trade in the 
market and claims that the mechanism of full price liberalization is not the best for Russia. The paper [19] 
describes the developed model of auctioning electricity which can be considered as a technical tool for 
organizing the day-ahead wholesale trading. The system operator uses this model to calculate optimal volumes 
and prices. Nodal prices are determined by the mechanism similar to Mechanism of Locational Marginal 
Pricing, i.e. by dual variables of the optimization problem. In [20, 21] the authors consider the interaction in the 
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electricity market of Russia and use Cournot model for modeling. Promising lines in the expansion of 
generating capacities are studied for the long-term future. 
Our research aims to solve the problem of modeling the electricity market functioning, analyze the situation, 
determine the most powerful players in the market, and find out the stability of strategies chosen by producers.  
1.1. Description of models  
The paper considers models without network congestion, but with constraints on generation. What we mean 
is the determination of price in the spot market organized as a double auction, where there is strategic 
interaction between firms that generate power (power plants), and the price is derived from the equality of total 
demand and supply. Power plants are different in their technological capabilities and type of costs. Therefore, it 
is reasonable to describe the market behavior by applying the models that divide firms into strategic producers 
that can affect the market price and competitive firms that do not take part in the auction, but take the price as 
fixed. It is worthwhile noting that the RF Law on electric power industry allows the participants of these two 
types to take part in the auction [22].  
All the studied models can make up a class of oligopoly models, which consider the dependence of power 
generation by competitive firms on the fixed market price taking into account the fact that this price will be 
affected by the output of each generator. Supply functions are called conjectured, since the firms can only guess 
at the reaction of their competitors. These functions have the so called coefficients of influence of each 
participant on the situation in general. 
Denote by  the industrial output function which will consist of supply functions of individual firms.  
 – output of firm  , 
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We will define the outputs of competitors for firm i  as  Pq i , this is the total output excluding i . Thus, 
the residual demand of the generation company i  is       Pqq iPQPi  . 
Here  – the price formed through the interaction of agents in the market provided that all consumers 
are aggregated by single nondecreasing demand function 
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ii qC 0tiq ni ,1 . Generation companies seek to maximize the profit on the 
residual demand provided in equilibrium the demand will equal the total output of the companies 
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The profit function of firm i  is concave with regard to P , and therefore has a single maximum. From the 
condition of the first order of profit maximization we will write the supply function for  generation company i : 
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where  – indices of influence of firm i  on the market state. They have the same sense as the influence 
of changes in the firm output on the output of the entire industry 
 Pwi
       PqPQPw ii ww . 
Each firm determines the supply functions of the other firms and uses this information, when maximizing its 
profit under the conditions of residual demand. What is important is that the scale of these reactions is assumed 
by firm i  itself. Hence, the answers can differ from the real reactions of competitors. Here the researchers see 
the interconnection between the model and the problem statement for the Stackelberg competition [11].  
A simplified form of this model is the SFE model, in which all interested parties have information about the 
competitors. Then the influence indices will be definitely determined as a result of market interactions in the 
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market. This assumption significantly simplifies the modeling. Variation in the indices of the firm influence 
leads to different equilibrium models: maximum influence will correspond to the Cournot model, and minimum 
influence – to the model of perfect competition [23]. 
Let us consider the above mentioned models on the basis of an example with the following preconditions: 
linear demand function and heterogeneity of generation companies that have convex quadratic functions, 
operating costs and constraints on power generation.  
Let  
PNPD J )( (2)
be the linear function of total demand, where J  – positive value;  
  iiiiii qaqcqC  22
1
, (3)
0,0 z! ii ac , ni ,1  – costs of firm i , strictly convex quadratic functions,  – maximum generating 
capacity of firm i . 
iV
All the models presented below have a common idea. In these models producers define the strategy of 
behavior by the described supply function, which in turn includes possible reactions of competitors to the 
change in the production of the firm. In order to rationally choose an optimal volume of production each firm 
solves the problem of profit maximization under the conditions of residual demand of firm i  (1) with 
conditions (2), (3). Function of the firm profit  is concave with respect to ni ,...,1 P , and hence, has a 
unique maximum. Then  
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Designate the index of influence of the i-th firm on the output of the whole industry by iw . Depending on 
what values this index will take or on how considerably one firm will influence the general supply function, we 
will have different models of market functioning. The supply function of one firm without considering the 
constraints on production is as follows. 
1.2. The Cournot-model  based models  
We consider several strategies. The first is the affine supply function which corresponds to that obtained by  
modeling the market by the Cournot model.  
In this case we can say that when submitting a bid  the producer will be guided by the price and the slope of 
the demand function at a possible equilibrium point. More complex interconnections will not be taken into 
account.  
We can easily come to the conclusion that the strategy for the case of the Cournot competition is . 
When we have capacity constraints, i.e. when we assume that the volume of production of firm i is constrained 
by value we have  
1 iw
iV
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The model taking into account the price taking firms should become a necessary expansion of the Cournot 
model for the electricity market. This model implies that several strategic firms (we will call them leaders) 
compete against each other on prices, and firms from the competitive environment choose the volumes of 
production, taking the price as fixed (e.g. a firm with power plants intended for covering the base load). 
Each firm of the competitive environment  solves the problem of maximizing its own profit at 
the given price, i.e. 
mk ,,1 
0
max
t
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J , the supply function of firm i (competitive firm) in our assumptions (2)-(3) takes the form (5), 
where JJ ˆ . 
In this case the theoretical supply function of the firm that takes part in the auction depends on the 
demand curve slope and the parameters of cost functions of the competitive environment. The model with 
competitive environment in the market will form equilibrium with higher consumer satisfaction and prices 
lower than in the model without price-taking firms. 
1.3. Models of Linear Supply Function Equilibrium 
The second class of strategies which can be applied to the electricity market corresponds to the model of 
linear supply function equilibrium. As in the model of price leadership, here we will consider strategic firms 
interacting with the competitive environment at the auction. It has to be said that the model described below 
represents a special case of the SFE model, which considers arbitrary supply functions. In this model we deal 
with the problem of multiplicity of equilibriums and complexity of finding them. The only way to solve it is to 
use linear supply functions of competitive firms. The use of this very model is reasonable for the electric power 
industry, since the type of submitted bids is usually determined by the rules of auctions. These bids can be 
either in the form of step functions or in the form of linear functions.  
It is assumed that the market rules determine the supply function for each firm in the linear form 
),()( iii PPq DE  (6)
nii ,,1,0  tE , where parameters iD  and iE  are chosen by firm i . At the given price level the supply 
functions can not be negative. Rewrite
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The second condition for attaining equilibrium is niaii ,,1,   D . In [4] the authors prove that under this 
condition there are nonnegative  that provide solution to the problem and determine the linear 
supply function equilibrium (LSFE). 
niwi ,,1,0  !
Allowing for constraints on power generation, the supply function for producers and equilibrium prices will 
take the following form 
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The condition of equilibrium ii a D  for each firm ni ,,1  means that the auction participants have an 
incentive to make the values of their coefficients n,,1iai ,   (in the functions of marginal costs) commonly 
known.  
Therefore, this strategy will imply that the producer is guided by the price, demand elasticity at this point 
and some reaction of the competitors to the change in its price and supply.   
For Russian market we constructed a model taking into consideration price taking firms. In the case, where 
the firms of competitive environment are in the market along with strategic firms, the equilibrium coefficients 
of supply functions are calculated by formula (7), where coefficient J  changes into Jˆ . It should be mentioned 
that the considered model of linear supply function equilibrium is true for the prices that are higher than the 
value of coefficient ia , which is the largest coefficient among strategic firms interacting in the market 
(nonnegativity of production volumes is provided). Otherwise, it is necessary to use piecewise-linear 
approximations [4]. 
Moreover, we studied the models in terms of the integration of several capacities into generation companies. 
Accordingly, the profit function of such integrations represents a sum of profits of individual plants. The 
generation company acts as a multi-plant monopoly, i.e. on the basis of the principle of equality of the marginal 
costs of individual productions. Let capacities l and k belong to one generation company. Its problem will look 
as follows  
      max,=,, , o llkklklklkkl qCqCqPqPPqqqS ,00,>0, ,,, tt lklklkq DE
where lk  have the form of (6). The decribed problem as well as the problem of  search for a solution in the 
model of supply function equilibrium has a unique solution in the positive domain of definition i
q ,
E , ni ,1 . 
Additionally, it is necessary to write the condition for profit maximization – equality of marginal costs among 
productions  within the company:    .= llllkkkk aPcaaPca  EE  
Theoretical analysis of the models showed that a) competitive environment increases production and 
decreases the equilibrium price as compared to the one-level interaction of strategic firms; b) from consumers’ 
viewpoint the competition among the linear supply functions of electricity producers is more preferable than 
Cournot competition. In this case the market achieves equilibrium at lower prices, and accordingly, with larger 
production volumes. Although each firm makes less profit than in the case of Cournot competition, the social 
welfare generally increases owing to the consumer surplus, and the equilibrium price approaches Walras price. 
Theoretical conclusions were confirmed in a number of test examples, which allow us to compare the 
mechanisms according to the criterion of social welfare maximization as well. The results were compared to 
each other and to the situations of monopoly and perfect competition.  
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2. Modeling of interaction in the Siberian electricity market 
We will consider only the modeling of the spot market and analyze the strategies of economic agents and 
their market power. In the given case we will discuss the modeling of interaction without network constraints 
on the basis of models described in Part1.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Scheme of the electric power system “Sibir”. 
Figure 1 presents a scheme with 15 nodes, for which we have modeled the price formation, taking into 
account the strategic interaction of producers in the market. Figures near the arcs denote the losses as a result of 
power transmission by the corresponding transmission line. We used the main characteristics of generation and 
consumption at the nodes by system, average hourly consumption, and average annual costs of producers for 
2008 in system Sibir [24].  
The demand function in our model is linear. The demand for electricity is generally thought to have low 
elasticity close to zero. The demand elasticity in [25] for urban population amounts to -0.165, and for rural 
population -0.28. The latter data were calculated for Siberia (Novosibirskenergo). In this case the parameter of 
the slope of the demand function corresponding to the elasticity of -0.3 equals 40 J .
Producers (power generators) were divided into strategic producers (that significantly influence the price) 
and price takers. The second group was made up of HPPs which were assumed to have zero marginal costs and 
took part in the market only with the volumes of generated power (Krasnoyarsk, Sayano–Shushensk, Bratsksk 
and Ust-Ilimsk HPPs). All the plants had constraints on generation. Transmission losses were considered as 
system-wide. Prices were calculated on the basis of Cournot model and LSFE model with competitive 
environment. The obtained prices were compared to Walras price, where the price was formed by equating 
demand and supply, and the supply functions of a firm were represented by the marginal costs per product unit, 
and by the price of the monopoly.  
As a result of modeling the strategic interaction in the wholesale market of the electric power system “Sibir” 
with the models of imperfect competition we have found out that:  
1) the lowest equilibrium price is obtained in the models that use equilibrium supply functions with 
competitive environment (linear supply functions in our case);  
2) the firms that work under the conditions of inelastic demand can considerably overvalue the prices with 
respect to the prices based on marginal costs (Walras prices);  
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3) in case of low water year (decline in the amounts of power generated by hydropower plants) the prices 
rise in all the models. This means that the market power of strategic firms grows slowly, and a significant 
increase in prices is determined by the market power of HPPs. Hence, it is necessary to add them to the model 
as active players.  
The studies based on the presented models were carried out for the low elasticity demand and low water 
year. Moreover, the authors considered the variants of strategy instability, where the players can unpredictably 
change their behavior. The latter can be observed in the real market, since the rules of the Russian wholesale 
market allow this. It is shown that the stable strategies are the strategies, which correspond to the LSFE model. 
And, hence, the design of the market should stimulate the formation of such strategies. The strategies 
constructed for the studied models are presented in Table 1. The columns show the deviations of the 
coefficients of supply functions E  of generation companies of form (6) from the marginal costs towards 
overstatement.  
Table 1. Coefficients of supply functions of generation companies interacting in the markets, which correspond to different market models 
Decrease in the coefficient of supply 
functions in the models compared to the 
marginal costs  (%) LSFE model  GenCo model Cournot model 
Irkutsk HPP 17 16 28 
Gusinoozer CPP  6 4 11 
Kharanorsk CPP  7 8 4 
Krasnoyarsk HPP 26 26 38 
Novosibirsk HPP  21 20,5 24 
Kuzbass HPP 3 3 22 
 
In the experiment Gusinoozersk and Kharanorsk CPPs were merged into one company, taking into account 
generation companies. The results of modeling are also presented in Table 1. The last column presents the 
values of supply function deviation from the marginal costs in percent for the LSFE, LSFE (GenCo) and 
Cournot models, that characterize market power of individual companies. The impact of some companies (for 
example Kuzbass) increases substantially with transition from one method of strategy formation to another one. 
According to the Russian legislation, in bid submission the supply functions of generation companies must 
represent linear or step functions (not more than three stages). In all the discussed models the producer 
strategies correspond to such functions (or to their approximations). The type of the bid to be chosen by a 
certain acting agent depends on many factors, including the level of awareness and the pursued goals. We are 
interested in the way the market characteristics will change, if the generation companies consider the strategies 
of their competitors differently. Potential instability can be caused by the following factors. If the strategy of 
the acting agent derives from the classical Cournot model and is determined as some fixed volume, then the 
equilibrium is achieved and will be stable. The use of the Cournot supply functions (5) may result in an 
unstable equilibrium. Here we give an example, where one of the producers adopts a strategy corresponding to 
function (7), which is more profitable under these conditions. The generation company following LSFE will 
make a greater profit as compared to the case where it pursues the strategy of the Cournot functions as well as 
the rest of the companies; moreover the profits of other players will decrease. In the transition from LSFE 
supply functions to the Cournot supply functions the inverse effect is not observed. It is impossible to definitely 
determine the behavior of the generation company. There can be an infinite number of described transitions 
from one strategy to another, which considerably complicates the analysis and reduces the possibility of 
effective market modeling. 
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This effect testifies to the stable equilibrium of supply functions in form (7). Accordingly, if we want the 
behavior of strategic firms to be predictable in the market, it is necessary to construct a mechanism for their 
interaction in such a way that it should stimulate the participating agents to use LSFE strategies. This can be 
implemented by increasing the number of stages in the bid,  representing it in the form of linear functions, and 
making it time-aggregated. 
3. Conclusion 
Unregulated market provides energy producers with considerable freedom to form their strategy. Any 
deviation of supply functions submitted by supplier to the market operator from the marginal costs leads to a 
decline in generation and rise in prices. These conditions form a non-optimal situation for the society, which 
decreases the efficiency and reliability of supply to power consumer. It is necessary to answer the question 
what deviation from the situation of perfect competition is profitable for supplier. It is rational for the electric 
power industry to compare the behavior strategy of two types (and our research has proved it). These are: 1) the 
strategy that leads to the Cournot model taking into consideration the residual demand (unsatisfied after the 
actions of competitors) and elasticity of the total demand function; and 2)  the strategy that leads to the model 
of supply function equilibrium in which firm behaves according to the rate of change in the total generation in 
the market depending on the rate of change in its own production (the Cournot model ignores changes in the 
total output that are caused by other market participants, at the same time the impact index is the maximum). 
The participants of the Russian electricity market are quite large generating capacities. The data on their 
expenses are easily available. This makes it possible to form a view of the potential measures and influence on 
the market of competitors, i.e. the correct market operation mechanism increases the probability that the 
outcomes described by the supply function equilibrium model will be implemented. Meanwhile, the present-
day bid submission system is formed in such a way that it encourages the producers to submit bids leading to 
the Cournot model. 
In fact, the generation company submits a bid represented by a step function for every hour of the next day. 
The step function may include not more than three stages, two of which (upper and lower) are determined by 
the technical characteristics of the plant. The game (strategy development) takes place only at the middle stage. 
This means that the strategy of the market participant is to definitely determine the price and volume at the 
moment of bid submission. When the number of companies competing in the market is limited, the data on the 
potential supply volumes of other agents and the demand function elasticity are enough to form the bid. In this 
case the Cournot strategy with maximum impact indices is profitable for all the companies. Thus, the rules of 
the given market encourage the producers to follow a model less profitable for the society (the Cournot model). 
The bid formation involving a larger number of linear time-aggregated stages will stimulate the companies to 
develop their strategy in accordance with the supply function equilibrium model.  
The considered models with an easily transformable structure are important to play out the results of a great 
number of market functioning variants and to select the most effective mechanism of organizing the interaction 
of market agents. Modeling can solve a number of problems: market power of agents and its extent, prospects 
for the system development and analysis of possible consequences of influence on the market structure, 
including the selection of antimonopoly regulation. It is important to choose an organization mechanism, which 
has the qualities of both optimizing the market and encouraging its participants to behave in a stable and 
predictable way. These issues touch upon the mechanism design theory and need to be discussed separately. 
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